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Abstract 
Irrigated agriculture is the most viable means of reducing crop failure, hunger, and malnutrition in Africa, and an 
effective means for improving the competitiveness of smallholder farming in most parts of Africa. 
Unfortunately, smallholder community irrigation schemes have proved to be unsustainable beyond external 
support despite the potential benefits of this technology. This appears to be exacerbated by the involvement of 
multiple stakeholders in the establishment, management and rehabilitation of the smallholder irrigation schemes. 
The objective of this article is investigating the changes in the involvement of multiple stakeholders in the 
schemes with the aim of establishing the effects of multiple stakeholder engagement in the sustainability of 
community irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe. The study confirms that a myriad of players are involved in 
different aspects of community irrigation schemes. The roles of these players have been very fluid in the period 
stretching from 1912 to the present moment. The irrigation schemes have been victims of unfortunate historical 
in both the socio-economic and political fronts that compromised the commitment, capacities and resources of 
the relevant stakeholders. These changes did not give farmers the opportunity to be self-sustaining in the 
operation and maintenance of the  irrigation schemes. 
Key words: sustainability, smallholder irrigation schemes, stakeholder, Involvement  
 
Introduction 
Globally, large investments in irrigation have been an essential element in increasing food production to sustain 
the ever-growing population (Perry, 1997; Svendsen et al, 2009). FAO (1995) estimated that food production 
from irrigated areas needed to increase from 35 % in 1995 to 45 % in 2020, in order to meet food requirements 
by 2020. Unfortunately, throughout Africa, there are hardly any cases of successful and sustainable farmer-
managed smallholder irrigation schemes despite efforts by Government, NGOs and private organisations (World 
Bank, 2008). The result has been low levels of production and rapid deterioration of the irrigation infrastructure 
that has required recurrent investments in rehabilitation- failing to generate returns commensurate with 
expectations and their design potential (Dittoh, 1991; Webb, 1991; SADC, 1992; Postel et. al. 2001; Shah et al, 
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2002; Shah and Keller, 2002; Denison and Manona, 2007). In Zimbabwe, irrigation agriculture is critical 
because 80% of its rural population live in areas rainfall is erratic and unreliable, with a success rate of rain-fed 
agriculture known to be in the order of one good harvest in every four to five years (FAO, 1995; FAO, 2000; 
Poulton et al, 2002).  Considering the multiple stakeholders that have been involved in the establishment , 
rehabilitation and management of irrigation schemes,  during both the pre- and post- Independence period, there 





The development of smallholder irrigation systems has been promoted since the pre independence period as the 
strategic answer to food deficit. A lot of investment has been channelled to the development of irrigation 
infrastructure through Government and through different Non Governmental Organisations. However, many of 
these schemes across the country have been facing sustainability challenges which have left some of them in a 
state of disrepair or operating below their design capacity despite their critical value (for both the Government 
and the communities) for food security, stabilisation of agricultural production, employment creation and 
poverty alleviation. It is acknowledged that a number of researches have been carried out on community 
smallholder irrigation schemes but the focus has been mainly on analysis of the design options, water 
management, performance of small holder irrigation systems, financial viability of different crops under 
irrigation schemes, the identification of appropriate irrigation technologies and the socio- economic impacts of 
these schemes (Makadho, 2000; Makombe, Makadho and  Sampath, 2004; Makombe and Sampath, 2010; 
Meinzen-Dick, 1993; Meinzen-Dick, Makombe and Sullins 1993; Mupawose, 1984; Ruigu and Rukuni, 1990; 
FAO, 2000 and Rukuni, 1984). Little has so far been done to holistically investigate the dynamics of stakeholder 
engagement in irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe especially in the post inflation era. This research therefore, seeks 
to establish how the dynamics in the involvement of multiple stakeholders in smallholder community irrigation 
schemes have been affecting their sustainability. 
 
Materials and methods 
Study area 
All the irrigation schemes targeted for the study are located in Natural Region V of the southeast lowveld. This 
Region is characterized by low rainfall, less than 450mm per annum, which is often erratic and not adequate for 
crop production (FAO, 2000).  
The irrigation schemes were purposively selected because they were all located in an area where irrigation was 
critical for any meaningful harvest and the stakeholder involved were more likely to be pressured to sustain 
irrigation agriculture in this area than any other part of the country. Both quantitative and qualitative research 
methods were employed. A semi structured household questionnaire was used to collect both quantitative and 
qualitative data from the irrigation plot holders in 3 small holder irrigation schemes. Data obtained from the 
questionnaire survey was augmented by Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews and direct 
observations targeting the 3 schemes. The combination of different research methods allowed for triangulation of 
information. The simple random sampling method was used for selecting participating farmers and 40% of the 
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farmers were selected for questionnaire survey. Tsovani (300 hectares), Dendere (20 hectares) and Mtandahwe 
(23 hectares) irrigation schemes had a total membership of 120, 38 and 167 farmers respectively. In total, 130 
farmers were interviewed. Three FGDs were conducted in the three schemes (one FGD per scheme). FGD 
participants were selected from the farmers who had not participated in the questionnaire interviews. A total of 
12 farmers participated in each FGDs, to give a total of 36 participants (50% of which were females) in the 
study. District Heads of institutions from Agricultural Research Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX), 
Department of Irrigation (DOI), Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), Zimbabwe National Water 
Authority (ZINWA). Six key informant interviews were conducted with these institutions, to provide 
institutional perspective on the dynamics of stakeholder engagement in the irrigation schemes. Three key 
informant interviews were also conducted with the Irrigation Management Committees (IMCs) of the three 
schemes to give a total of nine key informant interviews conducted in this study. The data obtained from the 
questionnaire survey was inputted into SPSSx version 16.0 (Statistical Package for Social Scientists). Data was 
subjected to both descriptive analysis, to produce frequency tables and cross tabulations and advanced statistical 
analysis through regression analysis and one way ANOVA.  
 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The historical development of smallholder community irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe can be traced back from 
1912 when Zimbabwe was still under colonial rule. The main stakeholder that was responsible for establishment 
of schemes was the Ministry of African Affairs which assumed are more controlling stake in the affairs of the 
irrigation schemes from 1927 onwards  (Alvord, 1933).  From 1936, dryland plots for irrigation scheme 
beneficiaries were prohibited and the Ministry had to stipulate the type of crops to be grown in the schemes 
(Manzungu 2005). The tenure of the schemes was highly insecure as their stay in the scheme remained hanged 
on annually renewable permits which were revocable anytime. The then District Commissioner was directing the 
operation of the schemes at district level with the assistance of a resident scheme based Irrigation manager 
(Manzungu 2005). The management system survived for decades in the face serious opposition from the farmers 
and the raging war of liberation. When Zimbabwe gained independence, the government objective in promoting 
irrigation schemes was two pronged. One objective was to democratise the operations in the scheme and to 
enhance food security and poverty alleviation in the rural communities (Matsika, 1996).  
 
The changes that were made to the irrigation sector since 1980 were visibly on an experimental basis as the 
structure and composition of Government stakeholders involved remained fluid to the present moment. The 
Department of Rural Development (DERUDE) was mandated with the development and management of 
irrigation schemes while the designing and planning was given to the Department of Agricultural, Technical and 
Extension Services, (AGRITEX).  DERUDE introduced the concept of Irrigation management Committees to 
promote democracy in the running of the schemes (Chidenga, 2003) and before the concept was fully 
operational, the development and management responsibility was transferred to AGRITEX in 1985 until 2001. 
Meanwhile, the  Agricultural and Rural Development Agency (ARDA) was managing an  operate and transfer 
schemes out-grower model in which ARDA was expected to gradually transfer management and ownership to 
the smallholder irrigation farmers (FAO, 2001). Tsvovani was one such a scheme in Chiredzi district. During 
this phase, the schemes were dominated by Government stakeholders and were heavily subsidized until the 
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introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) in the early 1990s. ESAP saw the sudden 
withdrawal of subsidies and even under the ARDA’s out- grower model, the management transfer failed to be as 
gradual as was planned to the detriment of the farmers (Mombeshora, 2003). The farmers started to feel the 
burden of heavy operation costs especially for the pumped schemes that were using electricity.  
 
During the 1990s, a new Water Act replaced water rights and water permits- introducing Catchment Councils to 
manage water leading to the  creation of ZINWA (under the Ministry of water development) to manage water 
and the catchment councils in pursuit of the User Pays Principle (Chidenga, 2003). The Government other  
stakeholders that have been involved in the smallholder irrigation schemes  included the  Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development(MARD), Ministry of Rural Resources and Water Development (MRRWD) and the 
Department of Irrigation (DOI), Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA), The District 
Development Fund (DDF), The Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing and  the 
Rural District Councils, Ministry of Finance, parastatal agencies like ZESA and  the Grain Marketing Board. 
Other stakeholder included Non- Governmental Organisations, private companies and more importantly the 
beneficiary farmers (Nhundu & Mushunje, 2010).  
  Between the year 2000 and 2009, a combination of the chaotic fast track land reform program, poor 
international relations, lack of direct foreign investment and hyper-inflation in Zimbabwe culminated in the 
general neglect of irrigation agriculture by the critical stakeholders making the majority of them non-functional 
(Nhundu & Mushunje,  2010 This general state of disrepair of the irrigation schemes attracted a new set of 
stakeholders to fill the chasm created by the Government stakeholders (Mutambara  & Hungwe, 2011). These 
were NGOs, backed by different donor that came to rehabilitate the schemes which had suffered neglects for a 
decade. Unfortunately, some of the irrigation schemes that were rehabilitated during this time became non-
functional hardly 2 years after rehabilitation. The study seeks to investigate how the changes in stakeholder 
involvement in Zimbabwe’s irrigation schemes affected their sustainability. 
Results and discussions 
Demographic characteristics of the respondents  
The majority of the respondents were between 30 and 69 years of age. Fifty eight percent of the respondents 
were females while 42% were males. Seventy two percent of the respondents were married, 21% were widowed 
while 6% and 3% were single and divorced respectively. The average household size for all interviewed 
households was 7 against 5 at national level (ZimVac, 2012). The sex and age disaggregation of the farmers in 
the schemes confirmed Muparange (2002) report that in smallholder irrigation schemes, the most interested 
people were females and that the youth were generally not interested in agricultural production. This can impose 
potential threats to the future sustainability of these schemes as no institutional memory will be left after the 
current generation of farmers got out of picture (Shah et al, 2002). 
The farmers in the scheme had extra burdens to care for their vulnerable household members which were 
competing with their attention and commitment in the irrigation schemes Sixty eight percent of the households 
had children less than 5 years of age with an average of 3 children under 5. Twenty percent had members who 
were chronically ill, 3% had terminally ill patients. Four percent had at least a member who was disabled or 
mentally ill and 37% had orphans.  
Educational level of the farmers 
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The level of illiteracy was on average higher than the national average, with an average of 37% of the farmers 
having not attained any level of education against a national average of 18.7% (ZimVac, 2012). This was 
especially true for Dendere and Tsvovani whose illiteracy level was 60% and 65% respectively, while at 
Mtandahwe only 12% of farmers had not attained any education at all. Less than 2% were educated beyond 
Ordinary Level against a national average of 3%. 
The differences in the level of education of members in the 3 irrigation schemes were found to be significant by 
one way ANOVA at P< 0.005, in favour of Mtandahwe irrigation scheme which had the least number of farmers 
that had not attained any level of education. In Dendere, AGRITEX officers confirmed that the very low levels 
of literacy in the scheme affected their motivation to attend farmers’ theoretical training programmes that were 
aimed at improving the production level. The production of high value horticultural crops in irrigation schemes 
is usually knowledge intensive and the level of education of the farmer can be an important variable in the choice 
of crop and level of production. In Sub Saharan Africa, low level of education has been blamed for limiting 
access to information and understanding of commercial farming concepts which are critical to sustain high 
production levels in irrigation schemes (Shah et al, 2002).  
Stakeholder engagement in the management of the irrigation schemes 
Irrigation Management Committees (IMC). 
The roles of the IMC were changing with the changing of the socio-economic and political environment and 
some imbedded contextual situations of specific schemes. Although all the schemes had Irrigation Management 
Committees (IMCs) by the time of the survey, with the role of managing all the aspects of the scheme, their 
strength, their comprehension of group management issues and the grip they had on the farmers differed from 
scheme to scheme. Farmers also displayed some differences on their perception of the effectiveness of the IMC. 
All the respondents from Mtandahwe and Dendere felt their IMC was effective while 31% of the Tsvovani 
respondents felt their IMC was not very effective as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Perception on the effectiveness of the IMC by name of scheme 
Name of scheme 
Do you think the IMC is effective Total number of farmers 
 Yes No 
Mtandahwe 67 0 67 
Dendere 15 0 15 
Tsvovani 33 15 48 
Total 125 5 130 
 
The differences in the perceived effectiveness of the IMCs of the 3 irrigation schemes were found to be 
significant by one way ANOVA at P< 0.005, in favour of Mtandahwe and Dendere irrigation schemes that had 
100% of the farmers feeling that their IMC was effective. 
 Those who felt their IMC was effective cited smooth flow of activities (82%), peaceful sharing of water (30%), 
and transparent and safe keeping of money (60%), compliance of farmers to their orders (70%), limited down 
times after irrigation pump breakdowns (20%). Those who felt the IMC was not effective cited lack of leadership 
qualities as the major indicator of their ineffectiveness (30%), lack of transparency on their handling of cash 
(25%), succumbing to intimidation (15%) and the existence of inter personal conflicts in the scheme (15%). 
Some farmers no longer had confidence in the IMC as they strongly suspected some of the IMC members in 
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Tsvovani were pocketing their money. Consequently, some farmers were resisting payment of contribution 
towards the running of the scheme. Some blamed the IMC for lacking leadership skills and for being ineffective 
in containing conflicts. This negative attitude towards the effectiveness of the IMC in Tsvovani possibly explains 
why the members were failing to pay utility bills which according to the farmers were the major threat to the 
continued functionality of the scheme. Chidenga (2003) posited that if plot holders are well informed about the 
financial affairs of the IMC, they will have no choice but to be accountable to the members.   
The enforcement of the constitution in the schemes was found to be a strong pointer of the effectiveness of the 
IMC to engage the farmer. All the respondents indicated that they had a constitution in their respective schemes. 
Ninety two percent felt their constitutions were being used and only 8% felt it was not being used, all of which 
were from Tsvovani. Evidence for the utilisation of the constitution includes the punishment of people whose 
behaviour was not in line with the provisions of the constitution and that all the farmers were contributing 
towards ZESA bills. Those who indicated that the constitution was not being used cited lack of compliance to 
the provisions of the constitution as evidence. In Tsvovani, some farmers indicated that if all the farmers had 
contributed towards the payment of electricity, the Zesa bill could not have reached $40 000. Some farmers were 
not paying up. Although it was enshrined in their constitution that if someone fails to pay utility bills he/she can 
be expelled from the scheme, no serious action had been taken against the defaulters. Failure to expel non payers 
was tantamount to rewarding of bad behaviour and setting wrong precedence in the scheme. The IMC lacked 
power to operationalise the constitution.  
The effectiveness of the IMC in Mtandahwe and Dendere was shown by the fact that they had no problem in 
expelling non paying members from the scheme. In Dendere, the membership of the scheme shrinked from 96 to 
the current level of 38 due to the non payment of critical contributions by some members. Consequently, 
Dendere actually had a positive balance of around $500 in electricity bills and utility bills were the least of their 
worries. One striking thing about Dendere was that they had a reserved fund specifically for the repair of pumps 
which by the time of the survey was $900, kept in the scheme’s bank account. They were all confident that after 
a pump breaks down, it would never have a downtime of over two days as the reserved money was used to pay 
for its repair. Unfortunately the farmers, having this culture of group saving, were not making group efforts to 
procure critical inputs like fertilizers and certified seeds to boost their production. Some of the crops were pale 
due to lack of fertilizer but the very farmers were boasting of having reserved funds waiting for pump break 
down. 
Mtandahwe had no outstanding arrears but had no reserved funds; neither did they have a bank account. The 
advantage of Mtandahwe was that they procured their inputs in groups which allowed them to have fair 
uniformity and timely operations in the scheme. They were also involved in group marketing of products to far 
away markets, especially during times of local market glut. The most striking feature about the IMC in 
Mtandahwe was the presence of a marketing sub committee overseeing the marketing dimension of their farming 
operations. This, according to Mtandahwe farmers who participated in the FGDs, explains why they had fewer 
problems in marketing their produce. 
The different level of success of the IMCs was consistent with Chidenga (2003) findings that other schemes have 
disciplinary control while others were not tight enough as their real power and duties has never been clear. 
Chidenga (2003) noted that the IMC never got the legal status and administrative authority exercised by the pre-
Independence irrigation managers and District Commissioners. Consequently, although the IMCs had the 
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potential to effectively manage the scheme, they lacked power to operationalise their constitution and failed to 
transform the production levels, of the irrigation schemes to enhance their sustainability. 
ZINWA (Zimbabwe National Water Authority) 
Interviews with the farmers and the Agritex officers revealed that ZINWA played no role in the initial 
development of the scheme and only started to engage the farmer to make them pay water charges after the 
successful rehabilitation of the 3 schemes in 2009.  Farmers in Tsvovani had not paid anything to ZINWA ever 
since they started receiving the statements. It was not clear how ZINWA was going to react to the non payment 
although they were speculations that they were going to lock off their pumps to force them to pay, a 
development that will threaten the functionality of the schemes. Many stakeholders from the RDC, Agritex and 
Department of Irrigation have however questioned the sincerity of ZINWA in its dealing with farmers. When the 
pumps were under breakdown, ZINWA could not be seen anywhere closer to the farmers to give a hand in fixing 
them. It is only after the farmers would have won their war in the pump rehabilitation that ZINWA would chip in 
to bill water they did not help to extract. It was revealed in the discussion with stakeholders that when 
disconnecting farmers from water supply, ZINWA usually plan it when the crops in the schemes will be at a 
water critical stage as a way of forcing them to pay. This was in line with Mombeshora (2003) finding that 
ZESA and ZINWA usually disconnect electricity and water summers from farmers when the crops critically 
needed water. ZINWA’s engagement with farmers lacked materiality and farmers felt ZINWA wanted to harvest 
where it did not sow.  
Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services (Agritex)  
Agritex had a long history of working with farmers and was mandated to manage and development skill until 
after ESAP when the Government felt farmers should be independent and self-sustaining. Each scheme had at 
least one Agritex officer to provide extension services to the farmers. In Tsvovani, there were 4 Agritex officers, 
one in each block. During the initial development of the scheme, Agritex was responsible for subdividing the 
plots and guiding the perimeter fencing of the schemes. In Tsvovani, Agritex officers got access to the scheme 3 
years following the e withdrawal of ARDA. Farmers in Tsvovani felt the transition to the Agritex extension was 
negative as Agritex officers were said to be not as technically knowledgeable as ARDA extension officers. These 
shortcomings in the technical knowledge of the extension staff in the schemes was confirmed by the District 
Agritex officer, Chiredzi who indicated that some of them were trained through the Fast track trainings. The lack 
of technical capacity, according to the farmers in Tsvovani was compromising the production capacity of the 
schemes and restricting the type of crops the farmers could grow. In line with Denison and Musona (2007)’s 
finding in the South African smallholder irrigation extension support,  which they rated inadequate and 
unreliable to sustain commercial entities, the  District AGRITEX officer in Chiredzi confirmed that  the 
extension support from the department was not adequate to leverage commercial production in the schemes.   
 
Department Of Irrigation (DOI) 
It was revealed that the Irrigation department was a section within Agritex since 1985 that was given the 
Government mandate to stand alone as a department around 2004.  Unfortunately, the changing structure of 
these critical government departments was not matched with the necessary resources to capitalise the new 
arrangements. The farmers felt the Department of Irrigation was almost invisible and were not aware of its roles 
and responsibilities. They took no part in the rehabilitation of Mtandahwe and Dendere.  In Tsvovani, they were 
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seen once when the water pumps were being installed in 2010. The district officers for the department felt the 
irrigation department was the least resourced Government department in the district. Their responsibility in 
smallholder irrigation scheme was mainly land survey, canal pegging and certification of work done by 
contractors. They had no vehicle and their visit to irrigation scheme was contingent upon the convergence of 
interests by some NGOs or other Government departments visiting the scheme in which case the officer would 
ask for transport assistance. When developing engagement plans it is important to consider factors that can 
impede the ability of key stakeholders like the Department of irrigation to engage such as the accessibility of the 
location, capacity to travel and availability of technology.  They were largely office bound and did not have up to 
date information about the smallholder schemes’ functionality status and requirement.  The department of 
irrigation was poorly resourced and understaffed.   
 
ARDA 
As was highlighted in the literature review, ARDA was operating an out-grower scheme in Tsvovani where it 
was supposed to gradually handover the management of the scheme to the farmers and eventually withdraw after 
being satisfied that the farmers had capacity to manage the scheme on their own.  It unfortunately had an abrupt 
and unceremonial departure from the scheme as a reverberation of ESAP.  Although ARDA had long left and 
was no longer managing any of the 3 irrigation schemes by the time of the survey, its role in Tsvovani left a 
legacy that was worth exploring. The Farmers in Tsvovani indicated that when ARDA was still managing the 
schemes, it was doing everything for them on the scheme ranging from the provision of inputs, tillage, planting, 
weed management, nutritional management, harvesting and marketing. The farmers were at times asked to weed 
and provide manual labour in their plot and would just be treated like farm workers. For harvesting of maize and 
wheat, the farmers narrated that ARDA had combine harvesters which were rotating all ARDA estates during 
harvesting time to harvest maize or wheat. Fertilizer and seeds would come in 30 ton trucks for the farmers and 
all the cost were deducted from the farmers’ cheques after every cropping cycle. ARDA would also arrange 
loans from AgriBank for the farmers. ARDA owned the engagement process for stakeholders in the input and 
output supply market, the financial resources and general farm management. Farmers were very happy with the 
arrangement and would have wanted the arrangement to last for ever as they were now failing to manage the 
scheme on their own- pushing them into grinding poverty. One farmer said “…that is the arrangement that 
bought us the tractors we have but now I am failing to buy diesel for the very tractor to till my land”. The 
arrangement was good for them but its exit strategy was not well managed as ARDA suddenly withdrew from 
the scheme without proper handover takeover of the management of the scheme. Its major weakness was its 
failure to involve the farmers themselves in the process to preserve institutional memory and for the 
sustainability of the scheme beyond the management of ARDA. The ARDA management left a dependency 
syndrome in the farmer, that was not seen in Dendere and Mtandahwe, which is threatening the functionality of 
the Tsvovani scheme as farmers still expected outside assistance in the payment of utility bills and procurement 
of inputs.  What was probably lacking in the engagement process of the ARDA’s operate and transfer method  
was an empowerment element as it was devoid of plans about farmer’s future after ARDA’s departure. The 
arrangement was also a victim of unfortunate economic dynamics in the national economy, particularly the 
aftermath of ESAP. By the time of the assessment, the farmers in the formerly ARDA managed Tsvovani were 
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managing the scheme on their own through their IMC and the departure of ARDA opened way for the entry of 
Agritex and Department of Irrigation for some specialised services. 
Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) 
ZESA’s role in the scheme was to supply and bill electricity used by farmers in the scheme. Although its 
mandate never changed, ZESA faced some challenges during the period of hyperinflation when it was failing to 
supply adequate electricity to its consumers. It had to introduce load-shading to share the little available amongst 
the customers. Farmers were not spared and the power cuts affected their irrigation schedules and at times 
translated into water shortages for the crops. Farmers felt they were charged too much by ZESA and that the bill 
they were receiving was not commensurate with the limited power they receiving. ZESA confirmed that it was 
charging commercial rates on the smallholder irrigation schemes and farmers felt ZESA was not fair in its billing 
system. The ZESA bill was the major operation cost and burden especially against the background that such 
charges used to be subsidized by the Government.  Tsvovani owed ZESA almost $40 000 by the time of the 
survey and farmers were getting overwhelmed by the bill. All the schemes felt the billing system was unfair and 
was short-changing farmers. In Mtandahwe, farmers were collectively paying around $900 per month for 
electricity and although the farmers were fully paid up, farmers complained that there were no variations in the 
electricity charges to reflect the different electricity utilisation pattern of the different cropping cycles and 
watering intervals in the scheme. This was believed to be caused by the use of estimates to bill farmers as ZESA 
officials rarely visited the scheme to take actual readings. Even if they later discovered that they had overcharged 
farmers, the rectification of the problem was never done and explanations to it were not convincing to the 
farmers. Dendere farmers had similar experience with the farmers having about $500.00 positive balance due to 
previous overcharge by ZESA which took a long time to rectify. In both schemes farmers reported that ZESA 
would be very quick to disconnect the supply without verifying the accuracy of their bills. 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
NGO assumed critical roles following the withdrawal of government assistance, neglect of irrigation schemes 
and the general state of disrepair of the schemes. The farmers’ engagement strategies of the NGOs were never 
uniform and this translated into different impacts in different schemes. They moved in to fill the void created by 
the compromised capacities of government stakeholders.  It was revealed that NGOs were major players in the 
establishment of small-scale irrigation schemes and in their rehabilitation. They provided funds for the scheme 
establishment and in the rehabilitation of the schemes. Mtandahwe and Dendere were established through NGOs, 
World Vision and Red Barna respectively. After the pegging by Agritex, the NGO would oversee the 
engagement of the community, consultants, contractors/ service provider and all the relevant Government 
stakeholders. The meetings, workshops and trainings linked to the establishment and rehabilitation of the 
schemes were all financed by the NGO. The NGO was also responsible for hiring an engineer who did pump 
installation at the schemes, procuring the pump and paying for the perimeter fencing of the scheme. For Dendere 
the Agritex officers who participated in the perimeter fencing of the scheme were paid travel and subsistence 
allowances by Red Barna. After successfully establishing the scheme, the Red Barna grew crops for two years 
providing farmers with all the inputs at zero cost. The scheme was handed over to the community in 1997 and 
Red Barna left.  
In Mtandahwe the NGO that rehabilitated the scheme also constructed a grading shade, a 3 roomed office, a 
plinth and a summer season pump house to prevent the pump from damage by floods. It also procured all the 
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fencing materials for the 23 ha scheme. The fencing was done by the community under the supervision of 
Agritex and Mercy Corps. The chairman of the scheme had records on the costs of the rehabilitation cost and the 
cost of material and labour contributed by the community. The organisation also gave farmers seed and fertilizer 
for the first two cropping cycle after rehabilitation as a way of jump starting them into production. All the Zesa 
bills and installation costs were covered by the organisation and farmers started on a clean sheet. This helped to 
unleash the potential of the farmers as production cost at the initial stages were reduced to a minimum and would 
face actual cost when they have fully recovered. The variety of activities or intervention implemented by Mercy 
Corps in the rehabilitation of Mtandahwe irrigation scheme confirms (VanSant, 2003) argument that the 
sustainability of NGO efforts in rural development depend on the program quality and diversification.  
This was in sharp contrast to the experiences of Tsvovani and Dendere after rehabilitation in 2010 where 
they were not assisted with input by the NGO that helped them to rehabilitate the scheme. In Tsvovani it 
was just the replacement of the pumps, no perimeter fencing and canal rehabilitation was done. Farmers 
struggled to finance their first cropping cycle without fertilizers and sufficient seeds. The poor yields that 
ensued set the tone that perpetuated up to date and farmers were never given a chance to unleash their 
potential. Their ZESA bill that had accumulated over the period of breakdown welcomed the farmers after 
rehabilitation. They described the bill as the ghost that is haunting the scheme, threatening the 
sustainability of the scheme. This explains why the Common Wealth of Australia (2003) cautioned that, if 
donors wish to see benefits sustained, they should, on a case-by-case basis, also consider taking on 
responsibility for contributing to solving operation and maintenance cost problems in a more direct way.  
The approach used by the NGOs  who rehabilitated the  Tsvovani and Dendere schemes lacked materiality 
and responsiveness as they failed to address the crucial and most important concerns of the farmers they 
were trying to assist. 
Community/ beneficiary farmers’ participation 
The farmers in the scheme were the major stakeholders in the puzzle and the changes that were taking place 
within the economic and physical environment made them to assume different role and responsibilities. 
Discussion with farmers and other Government stakeholders revealed that beneficiary farmers mainly provided 
labour for their scheme initial establishment and rehabilitation. The following were the specific contributions 
made by farmers in the different schemes:  
 Tsvovani 
In Tsvovani few farmers contributed labour during pump installation with one farmer who participated in the 
FGDs acknowledging that farmers in the scheme did not contribute anything of material value towards both the 
establishment and the rehabilitation of the scheme. The different times farmers joined the scheme and their 
differences in the possession of lease agreements together with unequal accessibility to water by different groups 
of farmers challenged farmers’ cohesion in the scheme and everything that required unity. Farmers inherited 
high fixed cost from ARDA mainly in the form of electricity charges from very big pumps and several pumping 
units in the scheme. 
Tsvovani’s future was dangling in the air due to the ever ballooning electricity bill. Like in the other 2 schemes, 
charges were accumulating during the decade of disrepair. When the scheme was successfully rehabilitated, the 
farmers had over $10000.00 outstanding electricity bill. When they commenced production, the farmers were 
consuming electricity worth around $6000 per month but were only able to pay $1200.00 per month which was 
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only 20% of their monthly consumption. Consequently, the charges accumulated to around $40000 (from the 
main pumping unit, 3 sub pumping units at reservoirs and 2 disused borehole pumping units) by the time of the 
survey for this study. The scheme was once disconnected only to be connected after the intervention of the 
political leadership after which a contract was reached to extend the grace period for the payment to 6 months. 
Approaching the deadline in October 2012, farmers were nowhere closer to half full payment of the bill and 
expect another extension by 6 months. In order to convince ZESA, the farmers had agreed to pay $100 each per 
month for the month of August and September which could raise them $24 000 if every member paid up.  Asked 
why they have not been making such big payments, farmers indicated that they expected to raise enough money 
to pay the ZESA bill from the sale of cotton but when the cotton price dropped by over 260%, during the 2011-
2012 season, farmers resorted to the alternative debt settlement plan. ZESA indicated that disconnecting farmers 
from the electricity grid was the last option if they prove to be uncooperative and uncommitted to the settlement 
of their bill. Farmers indicated that they would not be able to pay the electricity bills without external assistance, 
making it a major threat to the future functionality and sustainability of the scheme.  
Farmers in the scheme seemed to lack a sense of ownership that was evident in the other schemes. The 
Commonwealth of Australia, (2000) hinted that people who are excluded from participation in planning or in the 
irrigator’s organization are likely to be bitter, disillusioned, and far less likely than others to cooperate in 
properly operating and maintaining the scheme, thereby reducing prospects for sustainability. It was certainly not 
by coincidence that where farmers had not been making meaningful contributions towards the rehabilitation of 
the schemes like Tsvovani, the farmers were struggling to pay their utility bills. It has been shown in several 
researches that the greater the number of people and the number of social groups who participate in all the stages 
of program development, the greater the probability that the benefits of a rehabilitation project will be sustained 
over time (Dzinavatonga, 2008; Bodibe, 2006).   
Dendere 
In Dendere, farmers who participated in the FGDs chronicled the farmers’ participation in the establishment and 
rehabilitation of the scheme which made them more committed to their scheme than the other schemes. During 
the same year when they were handed over the scheme from the management of RED Barna, they experienced a 
pump break down which was fixed after farmers had contributed Z$5000. Those who failed to pay the Z$5000 
lost their membership to the scheme and the membership dropped from 96 farmers to 54 farmers. After frequent 
breakdowns, farmers resolved to buy two new sets of pumps in 2007, with each farmer contributing 100 Rands. 
The membership shrunk further to the current number of 38 farmers in 2007 after the other members failed to 
raise the 100 Rands needed for the replacement of the old pumps. The plots size was 0.18ha and has since 
increased to at least 0.4ha. Farmers felt the plots were theirs and indicated that they would remain in the scheme 
as long as they were paying up needed contributions for the scheme to remain functional and as long as they 
abide by the laws governing the scheme as enshrined in their constitution. 
 
It can be deduced from the discussions with the farmers in Dendere that although, they had no documentation to 
support their ownership of the land, what they went through to have their schemes functional (especially 
payments and punishments for non payment), made them feel like people who had title deeds to their plots. This 
is consistent with the FAO (2000) finding that projects that were viewed by farmers as being their projects 
perform better than projects that were viewed by them as belonging to the government.  According to Tushaar et 
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al (2000) payment is an expression of value, if farmers are willing to pay for their scheme it shows that they need 
and value their scheme. Therefore the demonstrated demand in Dendere was a positive indicator of likely 
sustainability of the scheme.  
 
Mtandahwe 
In Mtandahwe, 157 farmers were admitted to the scheme during the establishment of the scheme and provided 
labour for the stumping, clearing of the scheme and perimeter fencing of the scheme. During the rehabilitation of 
the scheme between 2008 and 2010, the NGO that helped them, Mercy Corps, only brought off site rehabilitation 
material with the farmers contributing all the locally available materials and labour requirements. This 
arrangement saw the farmers moulding all the bricks needed for the construction of the pump plinth, pump 
house, packing shade, offices and toilets. They also dug the trenches for the main delivery pipeline and did the 
laying of pipes. They fenced the scheme with barbed wire and lined the perimeter boundary with vegetative 
fence as well as providing food for other service providers at the scheme. The farmers at Mtandahwe expressed 
that they shed sweat towards the rehabilitation of their scheme and the monetary value of their contributions 
towards rehabilitation amounted to about 30% of what Mercy Corps contributed. Such contributions were very 
critical in inculcating a sense of ownership amongst the participating farmers. Experience in farmer contributions 
in Mtandahwe and Dendere affirms Muparange’s (2002) assertion that community participation increases the 
prospects for social and economic sustainability because it gives people a greater understanding of how the 
rehabilitated scheme will work technically, how they can avoid breakdowns, and how everyone’s contributions 




The study confirms that the stakeholders that are involved in the affairs of smallholder irrigation schemes was 
been changing in structure, composition and roles. Even the beneficiary farmers, who are the critical 
stakeholders, have been forced to assume different roles and responsibilities with changes in the operating 
environment. The IMC in Tsvovani had problems in bringing farmers together and make them contribute 
towards utility bills due to group differences. As a result the scheme had over $60 000 outstanding electricity and 
water bill which was a major threat to the scheme’s future functionality. Where the IMC was relatively strong, 
the scheme had no outstanding bills and their operations were fairly uniform. Lack of effectiveness of the IMC 
was a major threat to the future functionality of the scheme as it compromises their resilience in the face of a 
dynamic socio-economic and political environment. It also had multi-pronged knock-on effects on a number of 
systems and sub-systems that made up the schemes.  
ZESA and ZINWA were blamed for not being very sensitive to the changing needs of the farmers in the schemes 
and for failing to assist the farmers when their schemes where under breakdown.  The billing system was rated 
unfair as it was riddled with insensitivities, inconsistences and unprofessionalism. Farmers felt the utilities bills 
from these organisation was a major threat to the schemes’ sustainability.   
The NGOs that rehabilitated the schemes had different practices and different levels of community engagement 
but what was common with them was that they never engaged farmers beyond provision of labour in the scheme. 
They never planned with the farmers, neither did they share critical information about the critical assets bought 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.19, 2014 
 
141 
for the scheme or contractual agreements with service providers. This level of engagement was not ideal to 
inculcate as sense of ownership and independence from external support on the farmers. 
The critical Government departments  (Department of Irrigation and Agritex) for the scheme were shown to be 
seriously under resourced to support commercial production and technical backstopping support in the schemes. 
The responsibility to oversee the sustainability of the schemes is split amongst different stakeholders and there 
was no one with the responsibility to bring the stakeholder together to enhance cohesiveness, responsibility and 
accountability in their service to the smallholder irrigation scheme. It was unfortunate that the over changing 
composition of government stakeholders was not being matched with the commensurate change in resource and 
capitalisation needed to operationalise the new structures. 
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